On June 6, 2016, in Simmons v. Himmelreich, the US Supreme Court held that a final judgment in an action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which dismissed the claim on the ground that the relief is precluded by an FTCA exception, does not bar a subsequent action against the federal employees whose acts gave rise to the FTCA claim ( (June 6, 2016)).

The plaintiff, Walter Himmelreich, an inmate in federal prison, filed two suits alleging that he had been severely beaten by a fellow inmate. Himmelreich claimed that the beating was the result of the prison officials' negligence in housing him with the inmate who had beaten him. Himmelreich first filed suit against the US, which moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the claim fell into one of the exceptions to the FTCA. The FTCA allows plaintiffs to seek damages from the US for certain torts committed by federal employees (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 2674). However, there is an exception to the FTCA for any claim based on the exercise or performance of a discretionary function. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss, finding that the decision of where to house inmates fell within this exception.

Before the first suit was dismissed, Himmelreich filed a second suit against the individual prison employees. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison employees, finding that Himmelreich's second suit was foreclosed by the FTCA's judgment bar provision in which a judgment in an FTCA suit forecloses any future suit against the individual employees. The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.

In an unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that Himmelreich's second suit could proceed because the FTCA's judgment bar provision does not apply to suits that are dismissed as falling within an FTCA exception.

The Court found that the FTCA's plain text supports this conclusion. Many of the FTCA's procedural provisions are contained in Chapter 171 of the US Code. The FTCA contains an "Exceptions" section that states that the provisions of this chapter (Chapter 171) do not apply to any claim based on the exercise or performance of a discretionary function or duty (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)). The judgment bar is a provision of Chapter 171. Therefore, the "Exceptions" section's plain text dictates that the judgment bar does not apply to cases, like Himmelreich's first suit, that are based on the performance of a discretionary function. The Court also held that United States v. Smith, in which the Court considered another provision of Chapter 171, does not control this case (499 U.S. 160 (1991)).