On August 12, 2016, in Seed Co. Ltd. v. Westerman, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit held that the continuous representation rule does not toll the statute of limitations on a claim against a firm after the attorney providing the representation leaves the firm and takes the client's business with her ( (D.C. Cir. Aug. 12, 2016)).

The plaintiffs, Shigeru Tamai and his Japanese company Seed Company Limited, hired legal counsel in connection with their patent applications for a correctional tape dispenser. The plaintiffs failed to obtain a US patent because of their counsel's noncompliance with the Patent Office regulations. As a result, another inventor obtained the patent for the same invention. In 2002, the Board of Patent Appeals granted Tamai priority for his patent, but in 2004, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remanded the case to enter judgment against Tamai.

In 2003, Seed and Tamai's US counsel split into two separate firms. Some of the attorneys left to form one firm (Westerman defendants), while the remaining attorneys founded another firm (Kratz defendants). The Westerman defendants continued to represent Seed and Tamai during the Federal Circuit appeal. In 2008, Seed and Tamai brought the malpractice action against the Westerman and Kratz defendants. The plaintiffs relied on the "continuous representation rule," which tolls the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim during the time the attorney continues to represent the client in a relevant matter. The rule guards against disruption of ongoing representations and encourages lawyers to correct their mistakes. The district court found that the statute of limitations did not bar any of the claims but granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor on the merits. The plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, the DC Circuit reversed and remanded. The court found that the statute of limitations on the claims against the Westerman defendants was tolled while the firm represented Seed and Tamai during and after the Federal Circuit appeal. However, the court held that the statute of limitations elapsed for the malpractice claims against the Kratz defendants because they had ceased working with the plaintiffs when the law firm split, and therefore the continuous representation rule did not apply to them.