No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Untimely Request for Preliminary Injunction: Seventh Circuit | Practical Law

No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Untimely Request for Preliminary Injunction: Seventh Circuit | Practical Law

In Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs' request was not timely.

No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Untimely Request for Preliminary Injunction: Seventh Circuit

by Practical Law Litigation
Published on 06 Dec 2016 • USA (National/Federal)
In Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs' request was not timely.
On December 2, 2016, in Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs' request was not timely ( (7th Cir. Dec. 2, 2016)).
The plaintiffs sought to place on the November ballot a referendum proposition that would impose local mayoral term limits. If approved by the voters, the proposition would disqualify the incumbent mayor from running for reelection in April 2017. The plaintiffs filed their petition with the city clerk on August 8, 2016. However, the county clerk refused to put the proposition on the ballot because Calumet City's administration placed three other propositions on the ballot on June 23, 2016 for the November 2016 general election. Separately, on August 25, 2016, the city council also voted to place three other referenda questions on the February 28, 2017 ballot.
A state election law, known as the "Rule of Three," allows no more than three propositions in any single election, and propositions are considered on a first-come, first-served basis. As a result, the county clerk could not place any more items on the ballot, and did not notify the plaintiffs their referenda item was blocked.
On September 16, 2016, the plaintiffs filed for injunctive relief against city officials, claiming that the city violated First Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Constitution of Illinois. The district court denied the request for preliminary injunction, emphasizing the plaintiffs' delay of more than two months after receiving notice as a deciding factor. The plaintiffs appealed.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision. In looking at the requirements of a preliminary injunction, the court found that:
  • Irreparable harm was unlikely because the plaintiffs could still place their referenda items February 2017 ballot in time for the April 2017 mayoral elections.
  • Traditional legal remedies were inadequate.
  • The plaintiffs likely had a colorable First Amendment claim, and therefore were likely to have success on the merits.
The Seventh Circuit then assessed the district court's balance of the harms. The district found that the plaintiffs' delay caused significant harm to the public because Illinois already had prepared its ballots to be sent overseas by September 23 and early voting began on September 29. The plaintiffs at least had knowledge of the council's actions to add three initiatives to the ballot by June 23, 2016, but did not file this action until September 15. The Seventh Circuit therefore concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the harm to the electoral system caused by the plaintiffs' delay outweighed any countervailing harm to the plaintiffs.