On January 25, 2017, in Koby v. Helmuth, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) requires only the consent of the named plaintiffs and the defendant for a magistrate judge to enter final judgment in a class action. The consent of absent class members is not required. ( (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2017).)

The plaintiffs brought a class action against a debt collection company under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The named plaintiffs and the defendant consented to having a magistrate judge preside over the case. The parties agreed to a settlement under which only the named plaintiffs (but not the absent class members) would receive monetary payment. An absent class member, Bernadette Helmuth, objected to the settlement, arguing that it was unfair and unreasonable to the absent class members. Despite her objection, the magistrate judge certified the class, approved the settlement, and entered final judgment. Helmuth appealed.

Before reaching the merits of the appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction to decide the appeal, given that it only had jurisdiction if the magistrate judge had the authority to enter final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) permits a magistrate judge to preside over a case (and issue a final judgment) only with the consent of all parties. The court joined the US Courts of Appeals for the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that, in a class action, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does not require the consent of absent class members. Rather, for a class party, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) requires only the consent of the named class members. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that construing "parties" to include absent class members would be unduly burdensome to the district court, given the difficulty and expense of identifying all absent class members.